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Abstract. In reverse mathematics, it is possible to have a curious situation where we know that an implica-
tion does not reverse, but appear to have no information on how to weaken the assumption while preserving the
conclusion (other than reducing all the way to the tautology of assuming the conclusion). A main cause of this
phenomenon is the proof of a Π1
2
sentence from the theory Π1
1
-CA0 . Using methods based on the functional
interpretation, we introduce a family of weakenings of Π1
1
-CA0 and use them to give new upper bounds for
the Nash-Williams Theorem of wqo theory and Menger’s Theorem for countable graphs.
§1. Introduction. The strongest of the “big five” systems of Reverse Mathematics
is the system Π11-CA0, whose defining axiom, Π11 comprehension, states that
∃X∀n[n ∈ X ↔ ∀Y φ(n, Y )]
where φ is an arithmetic formula (that is, a formula without set quantifiers). This axiom
is impredicative: the set X is defined in terms of a quantifier over all sets, particularly
including the set X itself and sets which may be defined in terms of X .
It is impossible for a Π12 sentence to be equivalent to Π11-CA0 (see [8, Corollary
1.10] for a proof); this means that any proof of a Π12 sentence in Π11-CA0 can be opti-
mized to go through in some weaker system. Despite this, Π11-CA0 is the best known
upper bound for several Π12 theorems (in particular, the Nash-Williams Theorem∗ of
bqo theory [8] and Menger’s Theorem for countable graphs [13]; rather than give the
definitions necessary to state these theorems here, they are discussed in detail below).
In this paper, we attempt to resolve this situation in a systematic way: using ideas
derived from the functional interpretation, we isolate the portion of Π11-CA0 actually
being used in these proofs, giving a family of weaker systems with Π12 axioms, and then
show that the proofs in Π1
1
-CA0 actually go through, essentially unchanged, in these
weaker systems.
Rather than being based on the Π11 comprehension axiom, we base our systems on
the equivalent leftmost path principle:
Let T be an ill-founded tree. Then there is a leftmost path through T .
Our family of weaker systems use the Σα-relative leftmost path principle:
Let T be an ill-founded tree. Then there is a path Λ through T such that no
path through T is both Σα in T ⊕ Λ and to the left of Λ.
Partially supported by NSF grant DMS-1157580.
∗Actually, the Nash-Williams Theorem is not Π1
2
, but rather can be deduced in ATR0 from aΠ12 sentence
provable in Π1
1
-CA0.
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We define Σα-LPP0 to be RCA0 extended by the Σα-relative leftmost path principle
Σα-LPP, and TLPP0 to be RCA0 extended by Σα-relative leftmost path principle
for every well-ordering α. Note that these formulations are still fundamentally impred-
icative: the path Λ promised to exist is still to the left of paths which might be defined
in terms of Λ itself. However the impredicativity is “partial” in the sense that we have
restricted, in advance, the complexity of the operations which will be might be used to
define paths to the left of Λ.
Our main results can be summarized as:
THEOREM 1.1.
1. Σ0-LPP0 implies ATR0 (Theorem 4.2).
2. Σ2-LPP0 proves Kruskal’s Theorem (Theorem 5.5).
3. AΠ11-TI0 (see [15, Chapter VII.2]) implies Σ<ω-LPP0 (Theorem 6.22).
4. TLPP0 proves the Nash-Williams Theorem (Corollary 7.12).
5. TLPP0 proves Menger’s Theorem for countable graphs (Theorem 7.16).
6. If Σα+2-LPP holds in a model of RCA0 then there is an ω-model satisfying
Πα(Π
1
1
)-TI0 (Theorem 4.3),
7. In a model satisfying Πα+2(Π11)-TI0 and WO(α) with α a successor, Σα-LPP
holds (Theorem 8.1).
Unlike the old upper bounds, we do not know of any theoretical obstacle to having
a reversal of either the Nash-Williams Theorem or Menger’s Theorem for countable
graphs to TLPP0. However the best known lower bound remains ATR0. It is there-
fore natural to ask:
QUESTION. Does either the Nash-Williams Theorem or Menger’s Theorem for count-
able graphs imply TLPP0 over ATR0?
We emphasize that this paper does not give novel proofs of any of the mathematical
theorems analyzed; our proof of Kruskal’s Theorem is unchanged from Nash-Williams’
proof [9], our proof of the Nash-Williams Theorem is taken from Marcone’s work [8],
and our proof of Menger’s Theorem is the one given by Shafer [13]. Our goal is to
illustrate that the methods here isolate the portion of Π11-CA0 already being used in
existing proofs, without requiring changes to the proofs themselves.
We briefly explain the motivation for the relative leftmost path principle. The leftmost
path principle is a Π13 sentence. Consider the analogous situation at the arithmetic level,
a Π03 sentence:
σ = ∀x∃y∀zφ(x, y, z).
If we prove a Π02 sentence τ using σ, we do not expect to need the full strength of σ in
the proof. The functional interpretation (see [2, 7]) can be used to extract a function F
from the proof of σ → τ together with a proof of
[∀x∃y′∀z ≤ F (x, y′)φ(x, y′, z)]→ τ.
Informally, a proof of σ → τ in a reasonable system cannot actually use the fact that the
witness y(x) to σ is a genuine witness for all z; the proof only used the fact that y(x)
is a witness for finitely many particular choices of z (where the particular choices may
depend on the value of y(x)), and therefore it suffices to use an “approximate witness”
y′ which good enough for this particular proof.
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The relative leftmost path principle follows a similar justification. A proof of a Π12
sentence from the leftmost path principle cannot depend on having an actual leftmost
path; instead, given a supposed leftmost path Λ, the proof must produce some (now
countable instead of merely finite) list of paths (again, depending on Λ), and use the
fact that none of these paths are actually to the left of Λ. An appropriate form of the
relative leftmost path principle then gives us an “approximate witness” which is good
enough for a particular proof. (This analogy between set and numeric quantifiers is a bit
misleading if taken too seriously; the arguments given in this paper are actually derived
from a functional interpretation for quantifiers over ordinals [3].)
We end the introduction with a short discussion of the proof-theoretic strength of
TLPP0 . We wish to avoid the technicalities of ordinal analysis in this paper, and noth-
ing else in the paper depends on these comments, so we will be somewhat informal. The
theories Πα(Π11)-TI0 are well-suited to ordinal analysis (for instance, Πα(Π11) formu-
las embed naturally in the framework of ramified set theory used in [10]; alternatively,
an ordinal analysis could be given by a transfinite generalization of the analysis in [11]).
The results described above show that the proof-theoretic ordinal of TLPP0 is the
smallest γ > 0 such that whenever α < γ, the proof-theoretic ordinal of Πα(Π11)-TI0
is also less than γ.
Since already Σ<ω-LPP implies AΠ11-TI0, whose proof-theoretic ordinal is the
Howard-Bachmann ordinal, the consistency strength of TLPP0 lies somewhere above
the Howard-Bachmann ordinal. Recall that the usual ordinal notation for the Howard-
Bachmann ordinal is ψǫΩ1+1 (this notation is explained in detail in [10], but note that
ǫα is the α-th ǫ number, where ǫ0 is the proof-theoretic ordinal of Peano arithmetic
and ACA0). The theory Π11-CA−0 , which adds parameter-free Π11 comprehension to
ACA0, has the same proof theoretic ordinal. If one instead adds parameter-free Π11
comprehension to ATR0, one obtains a theory with proof-theoretic ordinal ψΓΩ1+1,
where Γα is the α-th fixed point of the Veblen function; most importantly, Γ0 is the
ordinal of ATR0. (The definition of the collapsing function ψ has to be adjusted to ac-
comodate the presence of the Veblen function, so this notation requires some additional
work to make precise.) Inspection of the embedding of Πα(Π11)-TI0 into the frame-
work of [10] shows that the proof-theoretic ordinal of TLPP0 is at most ψΓΩ1+1. In
particular, while the consistency strength of TLPP0 is above the Howard-Bachmann
ordinal, it still requires only one level of impredicativity, whereas Π1
1
-CA0 requires ω
levels of impredicativity.
The author thanks Stephen Simpson, Reed Solomon, and the anonymous referees for
many helpful suggestions.
§2. Notation. We briefly recall some notation which will be convenient to use through-
out this paper.
We fix, throughout this paper, a computable bijective pairing function (·, ·) : N2 → N.
We routinely view subsets S of N as subsets of N2 by equating S with the set of pairs
x, y such that (x, y) ∈ S.
DEFINITION 2.1. If S ⊆ N2, we write field(S) for {x | ∃y (x, y) ∈ S or (y, x) ∈
S}. We often write xSy for (x, y) ∈ S. We write Sx for {y | (x, y) ∈ S}.
By a partial order, we mean a set ≺⊆ N2 such that:
1. If x ≺ y and y ≺ z then x ≺ z,
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2. x 6≺ x for any x.
We say ≺ is a linear ordering if for every x, y ∈ field(≺), either x ≺ y, x = y, or
y ≺ x.
When ≺ is a partial order, we write  for the reflexive closure of ≺.
We always use < to denote the usual ordering on N. We often refer to orderings by
a name for the field of the ordering, leaving the underlying order implicit. For instance,
we will refer to a linear order α, and to the actual relation as ≺α.
DEFINITION 2.2. A sequence from S is a function from a (proper or improper) initial
segment of N to S. A finite sequence is a sequence whose domain is finite while an
infinite sequence is a sequence whose domain is N. For any n, we write σ ↾ n for
σ ↾ [0, n]. We write 〈q0, . . . , qn〉 for the sequence with dom(〈q0, . . . , qn〉) = [0, n]
and 〈q0, . . . , qn〉(i) = qi. When σ is a finite sequence, we write |σ| for | dom(σ)|.
If σ, τ are sequences, we write σ ⊑ τ to indicate that dom(σ) ⊆ dom(τ) and for all
i ∈ dom(σ), σ(i) = τ(i). If σ is a finite sequence, we write σ⌢τ for the concatenation
of σ and τ : dom(σ⌢τ) = dom(σ) ∪ {|σ| + n | n ∈ dom(τ)}, (σ⌢τ)(i) = σ(i) if
i < |σ| and (σ⌢τ)(i) = τ(i − |σ|) if i ≥ |σ|.
If ≺ is a partial order on S, we extend ≺ to sequences from S by setting σ ≺ τ if
there is an υ⌢〈n〉 ⊏ σ, υ⌢〈m〉 ⊏ τ where n ≺ m.
We generally use letters σ, τ for finite sequences and Λ for infinite sequences.
DEFINITION 2.3. If≺ is a partial order, we say≺ is well-founded, sometimes written
WF (≺), if there is no infinite sequence Λ such that Λ(i + 1) ≺ Λ(i) for all i. If ≺ is
both well-founded and linearly ordered, we say≺ is well-ordered, written WO(≺). We
generally assume that 0 is the least element of ≺.
If ≺ is not well-founded,≺ is ill-founded.
Any element γ ∈ field(≺α) = α induces a new partial order, the restriction of ≺α to
{δ ∈ field(α) | δ ≺α γ}. We sometimes use γ to refer to both the (number coding the)
element of α and to the partial order given by the set.
DEFINITION 2.4. A tree a set T of finite sequences such that if σ ∈ T and τ ⊑ σ
then τ ∈ T . A path through T is an infinite sequence Λ such that for all n, Λ ↾ n ∈ T .
We say T is well-founded if there does not exist a path through T .
Equivalently, T is well-founded iff the restriction of ⊐ to T is a well-founded partial
order.
We make extensive use in this paper of the standard systems of Reverse Mathematics,
particularly RCA0, ACA0, ATR0, and Π11-CA0. [15] is the standard reference.
DEFINITION 2.5. If Y is a set and ≺ is a partial order, for any j ∈ field(≺) we write
(Y )j = {(m, i) ∈ Y | i ≺ j} and (Y )j = {m | (m, j) ∈ Y }.
If θ(x, Y, ~z, ~Z) is a formula with the displayed free variables, we writeHθ(α, Y, ~z, ~Z)
for the formula which says that for every j ∈ α, (Y )j = {x | θ(x, (Y )j , ~z, ~Z)}. When
θ is a universal Σ1 formula, we just write H(α, Y, Z), omitting the other parameters.
When we are dealing with anω-model andα is a computable well-ordering,H(α, Y, Z)
just means that Y = Z(α). Recall that the main axiom ofATR0 is ∀~z∀~Z∀α(WO(α) →
∃Y Hθ(α, Y, ~z, ~Z)).
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DEFINITION 2.6. If φ is a formula, TI(α, φ) is the formula stating that transfinite
induction for φ holds along α:
∀x ∈ field(α) [∀y ≺α xφ(y)→ φ(x)] → ∀x ∈ field(α)φ(x).
When W is a set, we write TI(α,W ) for TI(α, x ∈W ).
§3. Principles and Claims. In this section we introduce the main principles we will
work with through the rest of this paper.
DEFINITION 3.1. Let T be a tree and let ≺ be a partial order. A path Λ through T is
minimal (with respect to ≺) if there is no path Λ′ through T such that Λ′ ≺ Λ.
MPP0 is the theory consisting of RCA0 together with the minimal path principle:
If T is an ill-founded tree and ≺ is well-founded then there exists a minimal
path through T .
LPP0 is RCA0 together with the restriction of the minimal path principle to the
case where ≺ is the usual ordering < on the natural numbers. We call this the leftmost
path principle.
We will later show that the minimal and leftmost path principles are equivalent (The-
orem 4.4), and in a computable way, so in all the variants we introduce, there will be no
difference between the minimal and leftmost versions.
The following is proved in [8]:
THEOREM 3.2 (RCA0). LPP0 is equivalent to Π11-CA0.
We introduce a family of restricted forms of MPP0 and LPP0:
DEFINITION 3.3. For any n, Σn-MPP0 is RCA0 together with the Σn-relative
minimal path principle:
Whenever T is an ill-founded tree of finite sequences and ≺ is a well-
founded partial order, there is a path Λ through T such that there is no path
Λ′ through T which is Σn in T ⊕ Λ such that Λ′ ≺ Λ.
Σn-LPP0 is RCA0 together with the restriction of the Σn-relative minimal path
principle to the case where ≺ is <.
When we take ATR0 to be our base theory, we may extend this definition to higher
levels of the jump hierarchy. We will see later that even Σ0-LPP0 implies ATR0.
DEFINITION 3.4. Let α be a well ordering. If Z is a set, we say W is Σα in Z if
either:
• α = β + 1 is a successor, H(β, Y, Z), and W is computably enumerable in Y , or
• α is a limit, H(α, Y, Z), and W is computable in Y .
We say W is Πα in Z if the complement of W is Σα in Z .
If M is a model of RCA0 and α is an ordering in M such that M  WO(α) then
we say Σα-MPP, Σα-relative minimal path principle, holds in M if:
Whenever T is an ill-founded tree of finite sequences and ≺ is a well-
founded partial order, there is a path Λ through T such that no set Σα in
T ⊕ Λ is a path through T to the left of Λ.
TMPP0 is RCA0 together with the transfinite minimal path principle
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Whenever WO(α) holds, Σα-MPP holds.
Σα-LPP and TLPP0 are the restrictions of Σα-MPP and TMPP0 respectively to
the case where ≺ is <.
Note that TMPP0 and TLPP0 are axiomitized by Π12 formulas.
The minimal path principle is inconvenient to analyze, and for that purpose we will
introduce some convenient theories of transfinite induction.
DEFINITION 3.5. A formula is Π11, which we will also write Π0(Π11), if it has the
form
∀Xφ(X)
where φ contains no set quantifiers. A formula is Πn+1(Π11) if it has the form ∀xφ(x)
where φ is built from Πn(Π11) formulas using propositional connectives (∧,∨,→, and
¬).
We write Πn(Π11)-TI0 for ACA0 together with the scheme:
∀β(WF (β) → TI(β, φ))
whenever φ is a Πn(Π11) formula.
Note that a formula is AΠ11 (“arithmetic in Π11”) exactly if the formula is Πn(Π11) for
some n. In particular, Π<ω(Π11)-TI0 is precisely the theory AΠ11-TI0, whose proof-
theoretic strength is precisely the Howard-Bachmann ordinal. Other theories with the
same proof-theoretic strength include Π1∞-TI0, the theory extending ACA0 by full
transfinite induction (see [15, VII.2]) and Π11-CA−0 , the theory extending ACA0 by
parameter-free Π11 comprehension (see [10]). Despite having the same proof-theoretic
strength, AΠ1
1
-TI0 does not imply either of these other theories.
Since the theory AΠ11-TI0 is well understood, we introduce a family of transfinite
generalizations. We will show that these transfinite generalizations are intertwined with
the properties Σα-LPP, providing a tool to calibrate the strength of TLPP0.
DEFINITION 3.6. Let M be an ω-model of RCA0 and let α be a well-ordering.
We say M satisfies Πα(Π11)-TI0 if whenever φ(n,X) is an arithmetic formula with
parameters from M , Z = {n |M |= ∀Xφ(n,X)}, and whenever≺ is a relation in the
model M such that M |= WF (≺), and W is Πα in Z , TI(≺,W ) holds.
We do not require that α have any representation in M , and the sets Z and W are
therefore determined externally toM ; similarly, whether TI(≺,W ) holds is determined
externally to M . On the other hand, the relation ≺ need only be well-founded in the
sense of M . Consequently “M satisfies Πα(Π11)-TI0” is not expressed by a formula
of second order arithmetic inside M . However we can still ask this question of a given
model (taking α to be an actual well-ordering), and when N is a fixed model of ATR0
such that N |= WO(α) and M is a countably coded ω-model contained in N , the
statement “M satisfies Πα(Π11)-TI0” can be expressed in N by a formula of second
order arithmetic. In the latter case, N itself might fail to be an (actual) ω-model, and M
is an ω-sub-model of N . Importantly, in either case Z is absolute in M , and since α is
either actually well-founded, or we are working in a model N such that N |= WO(α),
the collection of Πα in Z sets is uniquely determined by Z .
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§4. Lower Bounds on the Leftmost Path Principle. We show that even the weak-
est principle we are considering, Σ0-LPP0, is fairly strong. We begin by showing that
it implies ACA0, which will let us use arithmetic comprehension in later proofs, and
illustrate our general method.
THEOREM 4.1 (RCA0). Σ0-LPP implies ACA0.†
PROOF. It suffices to prove Σ1 comprehension. Let φ(x, y) be a Σ0 formula (possi-
bly with parameters). We say a finite sequence σ from {0, 1} is valid if for each i < |σ|,
σ(i) = 0⇒ ∀j < |σ|¬φ(i, j).
Consider the tree T of valid finite sequences; T is clearly computable from its parame-
ters, and is ill-founded since the function given by Λ0(i) = 1 for all i is an infinite path
through this tree.
Note that if Λ is any infinite path through T and Λ(i) = 0 then ∀y¬φ(i, y, S): if
φ(i,m, S) then we cannot have any σ ∈ T with |σ| > m and σ(i) = 0.
By Σ0-LPP, we may find a path Λ so that no infinite path Λ′ computable from Λ is
to the left of Λ. Suppose {i | Λ(i) > 0} 6= {i | ∃yφ(i, y, S)}. Since Λ(i) = 0 implies
∀y¬φ(i, y, S), it must be that there is some i with Λ(i) > 0 but ∀y¬φ(i, y, S). But then
the function
Λ′(j) =
{
Λ(j) if j 6= i
0 if j = i
is also an infinite path through T and easily computable from Λ. But Λ′ < Λ, contra-
dicting the fact that Λ was relatively leftmost. ⊣
THEOREM 4.2 (RCA0). Σ0-LPP implies ATR0.
PROOF. It suffices to show transfinite recursion over Σ1 formulas. Suppose WO(α)
and let θ(x) = ∃yφ(x, y, Y ); we will show that ∃XHθ(α,X). Note that since φ is Σ0,
for any i, Y such that ∃yφ(i, y, Y ) holds, there is an m such that for any Y ′ such that
χY ′ ↾ m = χY ↾ m, ∃y < mφ(i, y, Y ′).
We will again consider a tree of potential characteristic functions for Y . A finite
sequence of natural numbers is valid if:
• For any γ ∈ field(α) and any i such that σ((i, γ)) = 0, for every Y such that
χY ↾ dom(σ) = σ we have ∀y < |σ|¬φ(i, y, (Y )γ),
• If σ((i, γ)) > 1 then for every Y such that χY ↾ dom(σ) = σ we have φ(i, σ((i, γ))−
2, (Y )γ),
• If there are j, δ such that (j, δ) < (i, γ), δ >α γ, and σ((j, δ)) 6= 1 then
σ((i, γ)) 6= 1.
Note that, since φ is a computable formula, these conditions are arithmetic (indeed,
computable), despite the apparent set quantifier.
The idea is that when σ((i, γ)) = 0, the universal formula should be true, and when
σ((i, γ)) > 0, the existential should be true. When σ((i, γ)) = 1, the existential
quantifier is “unjustified”: no witness is required. When σ((i, γ)) > 1, however, a
witness is required, and σ((i, γ))− 2 should be such a witness.
The final condition in the construction of the tree is perhaps the least obvious; the
point is that when we set σ((i, γ)) = 0, we might be depending on the fact that
†The simplified construction here was pointed out to us by Stephen Simpson.
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σ((j, δ)) = 1 for some δ <α γ but j much larger than i so that (i, γ) < (j, δ). If
we wanted to fix a potential characteristic function by setting σ((j, δ)) = 0, we would
have to restore σ((i, γ)) = 1, and since (i, γ) appears below (j, δ), we are no longer
moving to the left. Our solution is to require that once we set σ((i, γ)) 6= 1 in a path, we
are supposed to be certain about (j, δ) whenever δ <α γ. This is enforced by requiring
that we actually provide witnesses to existential formulas of all lower ranks.
There are no requirements when σ(x) = 1, so the function Λ0(x) = 1 for all x is
an infinite path through this tree. By Σ0-LPP, we may find a relatively leftmost path
Λ. Let Y = {i | Λ(i) > 0}. Since ACA0 satisfies arithmetic transfinite induction, we
show by induction on γ ∈ field(α) that (Y )γ = {i | ∃yφ(i, y, (Y )γ}. Assume that
Hθ(γ, (Y )
γ) holds.
Suppose ∃yφ(i, y, (Y )γ). Then there is somem such that wheneverχY ′ ↾ m = χY ↾
m, ∃y < mφ(i, y, (Y ′)γ). Then we cannot have Λ((i, γ)) = 0, so Λ((i, γ)) > 0 and
therefore i ∈ (Y )γ .
Suppose ∀y¬φ(i, y, (Y )γ). If Λ((i, γ)) > 1, there would be some m such that when-
ever χY ′ ↾ m = χY ↾ m, φ(i,Λ((i, γ))− 2, (Y ′)γ), contradicting ∀y¬φ(i, y, (Y )γ). If
Λ((i, γ)) = 0, i 6∈ (Y )γ as desired.
So suppose Λ((i, γ)) = 1. Observe that for δ <α γ, we have (Y )δ = {i |
∃yφ(i, y, (Y )δ}. In particular, if Λ((j, δ)) = 1 and δ <α γ then there must be some y
such that φ(i, y, (Y )δ), and we may therefore computably (in (Y )δ) find such a y; we
name this value y(j, δ). We define
Λ′((j, δ)) =


y(j, δ) + 2 if δ <α γ, Λ((j, δ)) = 1, and (i, γ) < (j, δ)
Λ((j, δ)) if δ <α γ and either Λ((j, δ)) 6= 1 or (j, δ) < (i, γ)
1 if δ >α γ
Λ((j, δ)) if δ = γ and j 6= i
0 if j = i and δ = γ
.
Note that Λ′ < Λ: if (j, δ) < (i, γ) and δ ≤α γ then Λ′((j, δ)) = Λ((j, δ)) by
definition, while if δ >α γ then, since Λ satisfied the third condition in the definition of
the tree, we must have had Λ((j, δ)) = 1 = Λ′((j, δ)).
We check that Λ′ is an infinite path through T ; let Y ′ = {i | Λ′(i) > 0}. Let
σ ⊏ Λ′ be a finite initial segment. Suppose σ((j, δ)) = 0; then δ ≤α γ and either
Λ((j, δ)) = 0 or (i, γ) = (j, δ), and since (Y ′)γ = (Y )γ and ∀y¬φ(j, y, (Y )γ), also
∀y¬φ(j, y, (Y ′)γ).
If σ((j, δ)) > 1 then again δ ≤α γ and φ(j,Λ′((j, δ))−2, (Y )δ), so φ(j,Λ′((j, δ))−
2, (Y ′)δ).
Finally, if there is any (j′, δ′) < (j, δ) with δ <α δ′ and σ((j′, δ′)) 6= 1, we have
δ <α δ
′ ≤α γ, and therefore σ((j, δ)) 6= 1.
So Λ′ is an infinite path computable from Λ and to the left of Λ, which contradicts
the choice of Λ. ⊣
Finally, we give our main lower bound on Σα-LPP0. Theorem 8.1 shows that this
bound is almost sharp, leaving a small gap between the amount of transfinite induction
we need to obtain Σα-LPP and the amount we show to be implied by Σα-LPP.
THEOREM 4.3. Let N be a model of RCA0 containing an ordering α such that
N WO(α) and N  Σα+2-LPP. Then
N  “there exists a countably coded ω-model of ACA0 satisfying Πα(Π11)-TI0”.
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The proof gives a bit more, namely that the same claim would hold ifN  Πα+1-LPP,
and even Πα-LPP if either α ≥ ω or α is odd.
PROOF. Working inside N , we will construct a model M . We will view a sequence
Λ as coding a model M by setting (i, n) ∈ M iff Λ((i, n)) > 0. Since M will be
viewed as a countable coded ω-model, this is saying that Mi = {n | Λ((i, n)) > 0}.
In order to ensure closure under arithmetic comprehension, it will be convenient to
have a name for the set Mi. We consider an extension of the language of second order
logic by countably many new set constants, S1, . . . . (For technical reasons, it will be
convenient to assume that this language has existential quantifiers and negation, but no
universal quantifier.) We view M as a model of this extended language by defining
M  n ∈ Si iff n ∈Mi.
We will define our tree so that when φ is an arithmetic formula in this language with
a single free variable, the set M(0,⌈φ⌉) = {n | M  φ(n)}. This will ensure that we
have a model of ACA0. (When we define conditions below, we fix a variable and only
discussM0,⌈φ⌉ where no other variables occur free in φ; there are no conditions on other
cases.)
The new complication will be ensuring that the model satisfies Πα(Π11)-TI0. Sup-
poseM were not a model ofΠα(Π11)-TI0; then there would be some arithmetic φ(X, x),
some n, and a sequence Υ, Πα in {j | ∀iφ(Mi, j)}, such that Υ is an infinite descend-
ing sequence in Mn (where we view Mn as coding a partial order). (The key point,
of course, will be that Υ is Πα+1, and so Σα+2, in M .) We will ensure that if M(2,n)
is non-trivial then it is some descending sequence in Mn. (We will also use M(1,n) to
make the coding easier.)
We will handle the dependencies of one set on another in a similar manner to the
previous theorem. For this purpose, we define
• lvl((0, ⌈t ∈ Si⌉)) = lvl(i) + 1,
• lvl((0, ⌈φ⌉)) = 0 if φ is atomic and not of the form t ∈ Si,
• lvl((0, ⌈¬φ⌉)) = lvl((0, ⌈φ⌉)) + 1,
• lvl((0, ⌈φ ∧ ψ⌉)) = lvl((0, ⌈φ ∨ ψ⌉)) = max{lvl((0, ⌈φ⌉)), lvl((0, ⌈ψ⌉))}+ 1,
• lvl((0, ⌈∃xφ⌉)) = lvl((0, ⌈∀xφ⌉)) = lvl((0, ⌈φ[0/x]⌉)) + 1,
• lvl((1, n)) = lvl(n) + 1,
• lvl((2, n)) = lvl(n) + 1,
• lvl((i, j)) = 0 in all other cases.
We say a sequence σ is valid if whenever σ(((i, j), k)) is defined:
• If i = 0 and j = ⌈t ∈ Sn⌉ then σ(((i, j), k)) = σ((n, k)),
• If i = 0 and j = ⌈φ⌉ where φ is atomic and not of the form t ∈ Si then
σ(((i, j), k)) = 1 if φ is true and 0 if φ is false,
• If i = 0 and j = ⌈¬φ⌉ then σ(((i, j), k)) = 1 if σ(((i, ⌈φ⌉), k)) = 0 and 0
otherwise,
• If i = 0 and j = ⌈φ ∧ ψ⌉ then σ(((i, j), k)) = 1 if both σ(((0, ⌈φ⌉), k)) > 0 and
σ(((0, ⌈ψ⌉), k)) > 0, and 0 otherwise,
• If i = 0, j = ⌈∃xφ⌉, and σ(((i, j), k)) = 0 then there is no u < |σ| such that
σ(((i, ⌈φ(u)⌉), k)) > 0,
• If i = 0, j = ⌈∃xφ⌉, σ(((i, j), k)) > 1, and σ(((i, ⌈φ(σ(((i, j), k)) − 2)⌉), k)) is
defined then σ(((i, ⌈φ(σ(((i, j), k)) − 2)⌉), k)) > 0,
• If i = 1, k > 0, and σ(((i, j), 0)) = 0 then
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1. σ(((i, j), k)) is a sequence 〈q0, . . . , qk〉,
2. Whenever i < k and σ((j, (qi+1, qi))) is defined, σ((j, (qi+1 , qi))) > 0,
3. If k > 1 then σ(((i, j), k − 1)) ⊏ σ(((i, j), k)).
• If i = 2 and σ(((1, j), 0)) = 0 then σ(((2, j), (k, q)) = 1 if σ(((1, j), k))k = q
and 0 otherwise.
It is easy to construct an infinite path through this tree (the sequence constantly 1
will no longer work, because of the conditions for atomic formulas, ∧, and ¬, but these
cases are easily dealt with).
Let Λ be the path given by Σα+2-LPP. We show that for all n,
1. If n = (0, ⌈φ⌉), Mn = {i |M  φ(i)},
2. If n = (2,m) and there is any infinite decreasing sequence in Mm which is Σα+1
in M then Mn is such a sequence.
Naturally, we proceed by induction on lvl(n). The first claim is identical to the argu-
ment in the previous theorem. The second claim is obtained by a similar argument:
suppose there is an infinite decreasing sequence Υ in Mm which is Σα+1 in M . By
construction, if Mn is not such a sequence, we have σ(((1,m), 0)) 6= 0, so we obtain
a new sequence Λ′ by setting Λ′(((1,m), 0)) = 0, Λ′(((1,m), k + 1)) = Υ ↾ k + 2,
and Λ′(((2,m), k)) = Υ(k), and resetting everything of higher level. Note that any
component which depends on the values at M(1,m) or M(2,m) (for instance, sets defined
by formulas containing the constant S(2,m)) has a higher index then m, and therefore
all its indices are greater than ((1,m), 0). Since Λ′(((1,m), 0)) < Λ(((1,m), 0)) and
Λ′ is Σα+1 in M , we obtain a contradiction, so Mn was already an infinite descending
sequence in Mm, concluding the induction.
This immediately gives that M is a model of ACA0. To see that M satisfies
Πα(Π
1
1
)-TI0, observe that if Y = {n | M  ∀Xφ(X,n)} then Y is Π01 in M , and
therefore any set Πα in Y is Πα+1 in M . In particular, any set defined by a Πα(Π11)
formula is Σα+2 in M . It follows that M satisfies Πα(Π11)-TI0. ⊣
Before continuing, we note that there is no difference in strength between the leftmost
and minimal path principle.
THEOREM 4.4 (RCA0). 1. LPP0 is equivalent to MPP0.
2. For any α, Σα-LPP is equivalent to Σα-MPP.
3. TLPP0 is equivalent to TMPP0.
PROOF. The right to left directions are all trivial. We prove the left to right direction.
Let≺ be a well-founded partial order. We define a computable map π from field(≺) ⊆
N to N<ω such that if x ≺ y then π(x) < π(y) (in the lexicographic ordering). We first
define an auxiliary map π′ inductively. π′ will have the property that its image consists
only of sequences of even numbers followed by a single odd number. We define π′
by the following algorithm: let y be given and suppose π′(x) has been defined for all
x < y. If there is any x < y such that y ≺ x, choose x ≺-least such that this holds, so
π′(x) = σ⌢〈n〉, and set π′(y) = σ⌢〈n − 1,m〉 where m is the smallest odd number
so π′(y) 6= π′(z) for z < y. If there is no such x, set π′(y) = 〈m〉 where m is again
the smallest odd number so π′(y) 6= π′(z) for z < y.
CLAIM 1. If x ≺ y then π′(x) < π′(y).
PROOF. We proceed by induction on the maximum of x and y with respect to <.
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Suppose y < x. We proceed by side induction on y along≺, so assume that whenever
z < x and x ≺ z, π′(x) < π′(z). First, assume there is no such z, so y is ≺-least
such that x ≺ y and y < x. Then for some σ, n, π′(y) = σ⌢〈n〉 while π′(x) =
σ⌢〈n− 1,m〉 for some m, so certainly π′(x) < π′(y). Otherwise, there is some z < x
such that x ≺ z ≺ y; then we have π′(z) < π′(y) by main IH and π′(x) < π′(z) by
side IH, so π′(x) < π′(y).
Suppose x < y. Suppose there is some z < y such that y ≺ z, and let z be ≺-
least such that this is the case. Then by IH, π′(x) < π′(z) = σ⌢〈n〉 while π′(y) =
σ⌢〈n − 1,m〉. If σ⌢〈n − 1,m′〉 ⊏ π′(x) for some m′ then we have m′ < m, so
π′(x) < π′(y). Otherwise, since π′(x) < σ⌢〈n〉, we must have π′(x) < σ⌢〈n − 1〉,
and therefore π′(x) < π′(y). If there is no such z, π′(y) = 〈m〉 while π′(x) = 〈n〉⌢τ
where n < m, so again π′(x) < π′(y). ⊣
CLAIM 2. Suppose π′(x) = σ⌢〈n〉 and π′(y) ⊐ σ⌢〈n− 1〉. Then y ≺ x.
PROOF. First, note that by construction x < y. We proceed by induction on y − x.
π′(y) must have the form τ⌢〈m − 1,m′〉; if m = n then we have y ≺ x. Otherwise,
there must be some z with x < z < y such that π′(z) = τ⌢〈m〉 ⊐ σ⌢〈n − 1〉. By
IH we have z ≺ x (since z − x < y − x and π′(z) ⊐ σ⌢〈n − 1〉) and y ≺ z (since
y − z < y − x and π′(y) ⊐ τ⌢〈m− 1〉), and since ≺ is a partial order, y ≺ x. ⊣
CLAIM 3. {σ | ∃x σ ⊑ π′(x)} is well-founded.
PROOF. Suppose not, and let σ0 ⊏ σ1 ⊏ · · · be an infinite descending sequence.
Since odd numbers are always terminal, each σi consists only of even numbers. Each
σi = τ
⌢
i 〈ni − 1〉 for some τi, ni, and by the construction of π′, there must be some
xi such that π′(xi) = τ⌢i 〈ni〉. Observe that σi ⊏ π′(xi+1), and therefore xi+1 ≺ xi.
Therefore the xi form an infinite descending sequence through≺, contradicting the fact
that ≺ is well-founded. ⊣
Now we define π(x) = π′(x)⌢〈x〉. (The purpose of this suffix is to ensure that the
inverse map is computable.) Given a sequence σ, define π(σ) inductively by π(〈〉) = 〈〉
and π(σ⌢〈n〉) = π(σ)⌢π(n). π is clearly injective.
Now let T be an ill-founded tree of finite sequences and define T ′ = {σ | ∃τ ∈
T σ ⊑ π(τ)}. Since Σ0-LPP implies ACA0, T ′ exists. If Λ is an infinite path through
T , π(Λ) is an infinite path through T ′, so T ′ is ill-founded.
CLAIM 4. If Λ′ is a path through T ′, there is a unique path Λ through T such that
π(Λ) = Λ′, and Λ′ is computable from Λ.
PROOF. Note that, since {σ | ∃x σ ⊑ π(x)} is well-founded, all subsequences of Λ′
consisting only of even numbers must be finite. Then we may uniquely decompose Λ′
into a sequence of blocks
Λ′ = σ⌢0 〈n0,m0〉
⌢σ⌢1 〈n1,m1〉 · · ·
where σi consists only of even numbers and ni is odd. Then for each i, we must have
π(mi) = σ
⌢
i 〈ni〉, so setting Λ(i) = mi, we have π(Λ) = Λ′. ⊣
Let Λ′ be a path through T ′ given by LPP0 and let Λ be the unique path through T
such that π(Λ) = Λ′. If Λ∗ ≺ Λ then π(Λ∗) < Λ′, contradicting the choice of Λ. The
second and third parts of the claim follow since if Λ∗ is Σα in Λ, π(Λ∗) is Σα in Λ′. ⊣
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4.1. Models of Σ1
1
-DC0. In this section we show that, in addition to proving the
existence of models of Πα(Π11)-TI0, TLPP0 proves the existence of certain models
satisfying Σ11-DC0. This will be needed in our proof of Theorem 7.16.
We follow almost exactly the notation of [15, Chapter VIII.4]
DEFINITION 4.5. We write O+(a,X) to mean that a = (e, i) for some e and i and
that e is an X-recursive index of an X-recursive linear ordering≤Xe and i ∈ field(<Xe ).
If O+(a,X) and O+(b,X), we write b <XO a to mean that a = (e, i), b = (e, j), and
j <Xe i.
We write O(a,X) to mean that O+(a,X) and there is no infinite sequence (ai) such
that a = a0 >XO a1 >XO> · · · .
THEOREM 4.6 (TLPP0). If T is an ill-founded tree and ≺ is well-founded then
there is a countable coded ω-model M such that T ∈M , M satisfies Σ1
1
-DC0, and M
satisfies that there is a ≺-minimal path through T .
PROOF. We first carry out the proof of Lemma VIII.4.18 of [15], taking into account
that we need to also include a path through T which will become our ≺-minimal path.
Let O1(a, T ) be a Σ11 formula stating that there is an infinite path Λ through T such
that:
1. O+(a, T ),
2. There is a countably coded ω-model M of ACA0 such that T ∈M , Λ ∈M , and
M satisfies O(a, T ) ∧ ∃Y H(a, Y, T ⊕ Λ) and M satisfies that Λ is a ≺-minimal
path through T .
If O(a, T ) holds then certainlyO1(a, T ), a = (e, i), and since <Te ↾ i is a well-order,
there is a Λ such that no path computable in a Y satisfyingH(a, Y, T⊕Λ) is≺ Λ. Since
TLPP0 implies ATR0, we have some Y such that H(a, Y, T ⊕ Λ), and we may take
M to be the set of sets Turing reducible to Y .
Since O1(a, T ) is Σ11, O1(a, T ) cannot be equivalent to O(a, T ), so there is an a∗
such that O1(a∗, T ) ∧ ¬O(a∗, T ), and therefore an ω-model M∗ of ACA0 such that
T ∈M∗, Λ ∈M∗, M∗ satisfies O(a∗, T ), M∗ satisfies ∃Y H(a∗, T ⊕ Λ, Y ), and M∗
satisfies that Λ is a ≺-minimal path through T .
The proof of Lemma VIII.4.19 of [15] now shows that there is a model M ⊆ M∗ of
Σ11-DC0 containing T and Λ; it follows thatM believesΛ is a≺-minimal path through
T . ⊣
§5. Higman’s and Kruskal’s Theorems.
DEFINITION 5.1. Q is a well-quasi-order (wqo) if Q is a partial order and whenever
Λ : N→ Q, there are i < j such that Λ(i) Q Λ(j).
A sequence σ from Q is bad if there is no i < j such that σ(i) Q σ(j).
Q is a well-quasi-order iff the tree of bad sequences from Q is well-founded.
DEFINITION 5.2. If Q is a partial order, Q<ω is the set of finite sequences from Q
and ≺ωQ is given by σ  τ iff there is an order-preserving π : [0, |σ| − 1]→ [0, |τ | − 1]
such that σ(i)  τ(π(i)) for all i < |σ|.
Nash-Williams gave the following short proof of Higman’s Theorem [9]:
THEOREM 5.3. If Q is a wqo then so is Q<ω.
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PROOF. Suppose Q is a wqo but Q<ω is not. Define σ ≤ τ if |σ| ≤ |τ |. Let Λ
be a leftmost path through the tree of bad sequences from Q<ω. Clearly Λ(i) 6= 〈〉
for any i, since then we would have Λ(i) = 〈〉 <ωQ Λ(i + 1). So we may write
Λ(i) = Λ′(i)⌢〈q(i)〉 for all i. Define c(i, j) = 0 iff q(i) Q q(j), and c(i, j) = 1
otherwise. By Ramsey’s Theorem for Pairs, there is an infinite set S such that c is
homogeneous on S.
If c were homogeneously 1, the function q ↾ S would give an infinite sequence in
Q contradicting the fact that Q is a wqo. So c must be homogeneously 0. If for any
i < j ∈ S, Λ′(i) <ωQ Λ
′(j) then we would have Λ(i) <ωQ Λ(j) since q(i) Q q(j).
This contradicts the construction of Λ.
Let {i0, i1, . . . } be the increasing enumeration of S. Define Λ∗(i) = Λ(i) if i <
i0 and Λ∗(i) = Λ′(ii−i0) if i ≥ i0. Then for any i < j, either i < j < i0, so
Λ∗(i) = Λ(i) 6<ωQ Λ(j) = Λ
∗(j), or i < i0 ≤ j, in which case Λ∗(i) = Λ(i) 6<ωQ
Λ(ij−i0 ) 
<ω
Q Λ
∗(j), or i0 ≤ i < j, in which case Λ∗(i) = Λ(ii−i0) 6<ωQ Λ(ij−i0) =
Λ∗(j). So Λ∗ is an infinite bad sequence and Λ∗ < Λ contradicting the fact that Λ is a
leftmost path. ⊣
We may observe that Λ∗ in the proof is Σ1, and therefore that this proof goes through
without change in Σ1-LPP.
Schu¨tte and Simpson [12, 14] gave a different proof of Higman’s Theorem in ACA0.
In particular, their proof shows that if there is an infinite bad sequenceΛ fromQ<ω then
there is an infinite bad sequence Λ′ from Q such that Λ′ is Σ2 in Λ.
We now wish to discuss the proof of Kruskal’s Theorem; inconveniently, the theorem
concerns trees in a slightly different sense than we have been using. To avoid confusion,
we will call these K-trees.
DEFINITION 5.4. A K-tree is a finite set T together with a partial order ≤T such
that:
• T has a unique root r ∈ T such that for all t ∈ T , r ≤T t and if t 6= r then t 6≤T r,
and
• If t ≤T s and u ≤T s then either t ≤T u or u ≤T t.
We write t∧T u for the infimum of t and u, so t∧T u ≤T t, t∧T u ≤T u, and if both
v ≤T t and v ≤T u then v ≤T t ∧T u.
If Q is a quasi-ordering, a Q-labeled K-tree is a pair (T, f) where T is a K-tree
and f : T → Q. We define a quasi-ordering ≺K on Q-labeled K-trees by setting
(T, f) K (T
′, f ′) if there is a function π : T → T ′ such that for each t, u ∈ T ,
π(t ∧T u) = π(t) ∧T ′ π(u) and f(t) Q π(f ′(t)).
THEOREM 5.5 (Σ2-LPP0). If Q is a wqo then so are the Q-labeled K-trees under
≺K .
PROOF. Suppose Q is a wqo but the Q-labeled K-trees are not. Define ≺∗K to by
setting (T, f) ≺∗K (T ′, f ′) if |T ′| < |T |. Then the tree of bad sequences of Q-labeled
K-trees is ill-founded, so let Λ be a relatively ≺∗K-minimal bad sequence given by
Σ2-LPP.
Given a Q-labeled K-tree (T, f), let F(T, f) be the finite set of proper subtrees of
(T, f). If T is a tree, write rT for the root of T and σT,f for the sequence of im-
mediate successors of rT (in an arbitrary order). We may equate (T, f) with the pair
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(f(rT ), σT,f ) ∈ Q × F(T, f)<ω. In particular, if f(rT ) Q f ′(rT ′ ) and σT,f <ωK
σT ′,f ′ then (T, f) K (T ′, f ′).
For each i, we have Λ(i) = (Ti, fi). For i < j, define c(i, j) = 0 if fi(rTi) Q
fj(rTj ) and c(i, j) = 1 otherwise. By Ramsey’s Theorem for pairs, we may restrict Λ
to a subsequence where c is constant, and since Q is a wqo, it must be that c(i, j) is
constantly 0 on this subsequence. In particular, since Λ(i) 6K Λ(j) when i < j, we
have σTi,fi 6<ωK σTj ,fj .
Let S =
⋃
i F(Λ(i)). Then Λ gives an infinite bad sequence in S<ω. By Higman’s
Theorem, there is an infinite bad sequence Λ′(i) through S. For each i, let ki be least
such that Λ′(i) ∈ F(Λ(ki)). Let k = mini ki and choose i least such that ki = k.
Define
Λ∗(j) =
{
Λ(j) if j < k
Λ′(j − k + i) if k ≤ j
Since Λ∗ ↾ k = Λ ↾ k and Λ∗(k) = Λ′(i) ∈ F(Λ(k)), we have Λ∗ 6 Λ. To see that
Λ∗ is bad, let j < j′ be given; if j′ < k then Λ∗(j) = Λ(j) 6 Λ(j′) = Λ∗(j′) and if
k ≤ j then Λ∗(j) = Λ′(j − k + 1) 6 Λ′(j′ − k + 1) = Λ∗(j′). If j < k ≤ j′ then
Λ∗(j) = Λ(j) 6 Λ(kj′−k+1) and since Λ∗(j′) = Λ′(j′ − k + 1) ∈ F(Λ(kj′−k+1)),
we must have Λ∗(j) 6 Λ∗(j′).
But then Λ∗ is an infinite path to the left of Λ, contradicting the choice of Λ.
To see that the proof goes through in Σ2-LPP0, we need only observe that we ap-
plied Higman’s Theorem to a path given by Ramsey’s Theorem for Pairs, and since we
may choose the path given by Ramsey’s Theorem low2 in Λ (see [4]), it follows that Λ∗
can be chosen Σ2 in Λ. ⊣
A complete analysis of the proof-theoretic strength of Kruskal’s Theorem was given
by Rathjen and Weiermann [11]; Σ2-LPP0 is close to (but not exactly) tight, at least
with respect to proof-theoretic strength.
§6. The Arithmetic Relative Leftmost Path Principle. In this section we prove the
following:
THEOREM 6.1. For every n > 0, Πn+2(Π11)-TI0 proves Σn-LPP.
Throughout this section, fix a tree T and a well-ordering ≺. We write Tσ for {τ ∈
T | σ ⊑ τ}.
All definitions in this section are assumed to be given in ACA0.
Before launching into the rather technical proof, we outline the main ideas of the
argument. We will construct a tree T̂n(T )
+
with the property that any path through
this tree computes a leftmost path through T . Roughly speaking, elements of T̂n(T )
+
consist of a distinguished finite sequence in T , viewed as a guess at a leftmost path
through T , together with “guesses” at the truth values of finitely many sentences Σn
in the path through T , and also together with explicit witnesses showing that certain
Σn formulas fail to define a path further to the left. An infinite path through this tree
will have to correctly predict the value of every Σn sentence, and produce witnesses
showing that no Σn formula defines a path further to the left; failure to do so will lead
to the path being cut off.
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If T̂n(T )
+
is ill-founded, we will have the desired leftmost path. If T̂n(T )
+
is well-
founded, we will have to show that T is well-founded as well; the key idea is that
because T̂n(T )
+
is well-founded, we may apply transfinite induction along it, though it
will take some work to define the right formula to perform transfinite induction with.
We now set about our construction. T̂n(T )
+
will be the last in a tower of trees.
DEFINITION 6.2. Let L be the language of first-order arithmetic, including a pairing
function (·, ·) and the corresponding projections p1, p2, with a new function symbol F
and a new predicate symbol Tˆ . We define the rank n formulas and the basic rank n
formulas inductively by:
• F (i) = j where i, j are terms is a basic rank 0 formula,
• All other atomic formulas are (non-basic) rank 0 formulas,
• If φ is a rank n formula then ∃xφ and ∀xφ are basic rank n+ 1 formula,
• The rank n formulas contain the basic rank n formulas and are closed under
∧,∨,¬,→.
We write Fn for the collection of basic formulas of rank n and write rk(φ) for the
least n such that φ is a formula of rank n.
When s is a set ofL-formulas, we define sˆ = s∪{Tˆ (n) | n ∈ T }∪{¬Tˆ (n) | n 6∈ T }.
We take ⊢ to be the usual deduction relation for first-order logic.
We now define the trees Tn(T ). An initial segment of Tn(T ) combines a sequence
from T with a guess at the values of the formulas Σn in a path extending this sequence.
DEFINITION 6.3. For each n, define Tn(T ) to consist of those finite sets s of L-
formulas such that:
• If φ ∈ s then φ is a closed basic formula of rank ≤ n,
• sˆ is consistent,
• If F (i) = k ∈ s and i′ < i then there is a j′ such that F (i′) = j′ ∈ s,
• If F (i) = j ∈ s then the sequence 〈F (0), . . . , F (i)〉 ∈ T ,
• If ∃xφ(x) ∈ s then there is some i such that sˆ ∩ Frk(φ) ⊢ φ(i).
We say s decides F (i) = j if there is some j′ such that F (i) = j′ ∈ s; we say s
decides ∃xφ if either ∃xφ ∈ s or ∀x¬φ ∈ s.
If i is largest such that for some j, F (i) = j ∈ s, we write σs for 〈F (0), . . . , F (i)〉.
If m ≤ n, define πnm : Tn(T )→ Tm(T ) by πnm(s) = {φ ∈ s | rk(φ) ≤ m}.
If m < n, t ∈ Tm(T ), s ∈ Tn(T ), we write t ≺+1 s if there is a formula ∀xφ ∈ s
with rk(φ) = n such that tˆ ⊢ ∃x¬φ.
Note that the construction of Tn(T ) requires arithmetic comprehension. (We could
probably, at significant additional labor, reduce this to computable comprehension, since
we are really only concerned with fairly direct proofs.)
When we write t ≺+1 s, we are usually interested in the case where t ⊇ πn+1n (s). In
other words, just looking at πn+1n (s), we had not yet found a witness to the formula ¬φ,
but t is a way of extending πn+1n (s) so that ¬φ must be true. This induces a different
element t′ ∈ Tn(T ) with πn+1n (t′) = t ⊇ πn+1n (s). We think of t′ as being to the left of
s (as the notation≺+1 implies); this means that witnessed existential statements belong
to the left of universal statements, and therefore that a leftmost path through Tn(T ) is
exactly a path in which we guess Σn formulas correctly.
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LEMMA 6.4 (ACA0). If s ∈ Tn+1(T ), t ∈ Tn(T ), t ⊇ πn+1n (s) and t 6≺+1 s then
t ∪ s ∈ Tn+1(T ).
PROOF. We need only check that t̂ ∪ s is consistent. Suppose not. Since t is consis-
tent, tˆ ⊢ ¬φ for some φ ∈ s of rank n+1. It cannot be that φ is universal, since then we
would have t ≺+1 s, so φ must be existential. But if φ is existential then πn+1n (s) ⊢ φ,
and since t is consistent and extends πn+1n (s), we cannot have tˆ ⊢ ¬φ. ⊣
DEFINITION 6.5. For each n, we define properties WF ′n ⊆ Tn(T ) and WFn ⊆
Tn(T ) inductively as follows.
• WF ′0(t) holds if:
Suppose that for every τ ≺ σt, Tτ is well-founded. Then Tσt is well-
founded.
• WF ′n+1(t) holds if:
Suppose that for all s ⊇ πn+1n (t) such that s ≺+1 t, WFn(s); then for
all s ⊇ πn+1n (t), WFn(s).
• WFn(t) holds if for every s ⊇ t in Tn, WF ′n(s).
We have stated WF ′0 and WF0 to emphasize the similarity with WF ′n and WFn,
however WF ′0(t) actually immediately implies WF0(t): if WF ′0(t) holds, s ⊇ t, and
for every τ ≺ σs, Tτ is well-founded, then also for every τ ≺ σt, Tτ is well-founded,
and therefore Tσt is well-founded, which implies that Tσs is well-founded. This means
that WF0 is (equivalent to) a Boolean combination of Π0(Π11) formulas, and so for each
n > 0, WFn is (equivalent to) a Πn+1(Π11) formula.
WF ′0 (and therefore WF0) captures the notion of “not being an initial segment of
the leftmost path”: WF0(t) holds if either the tree above t is well-founded, or if some
path to the left is ill-founded. Thus the only elements failing WF0(t) are the initial
segments of the leftmost path itself. WF ′n+1 extends this to the higher order trees; we
view t ∈ Tn(T ) as consisting of two components: πn+1n (t), which is the lower order
content which should be addressed by lower order trees, and the remainder. WF ′n+1
will be defined so that when WF ′n+1(t) fails to hold, it must be that not only does
WFn(π
n+1
n (t)) fail, essentially saying that πn+1n (t) is an initial segment of a leftmost
path, but that t is correct about truth values along this leftmost path. Equivalently,
WF ′n+1(t) holds if either some s ≺+1 t belongs to the leftmost path through Tn(T ), or
if no extension of πn+1n (t) which is compatible with t belongs to such a path.
LEMMA 6.6 (ACA0). If WFn(s) and s ⊆ t then WFn(t).
PROOF. Immediate, since the definition is monotonic. ⊣
LEMMA 6.7 (ACA0). If WFn(πn+1n (t)) then WFn+1(t).
PROOF. Assuming WFn(πn+1n (t)), for every s ⊇ πn+1n (t), WFn(s). This implies
WFn+1(t). ⊣
LEMMA 6.8 (Π1(Π11)-TI0). Let φ be a basic rank 0 formula, let s ∈ T0(T ), and
suppose that for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, WF0(t). Then WF0(s).
PROOF. φ has the form F (i) = j for some j. By main induction on r, we show that
Whenever t ⊇ s with |σt| = i+ 1− r, WF0(t).
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If r = 0, any such t decides F (i) = j, and therefore by assumption, WF0(t).
Suppose the claim holds for r and let t ⊇ s be given with |σt| = i + 1 − (r +
1) = i − r. If there is a τ ≺ σt such that Tτ is ill-founded then we immediately
have WF0(t). So assume that for every τ ≺ σt, Tτ is well-founded. For each k, let
tk = t∪{F (|σt|) = k}. By side induction on k along≺, we will show that Tσtk is well-
founded. Suppose that for all k′ ≺ k with tk′ ∈ T0(T ), Tσt
k′
is well-founded. Since
|σtk | = |σt|+ 1 = i+ 1− r, we have WF0(tk). If τ ≺ σtk and τ ∈ T , we either have
τ ≺ σt, in which case we have assumed Tτ is well-founded, or τ = σ⌢t 〈k′〉 = σtk′
for some k′ ≺ k, in which case we have that Tτ is well-founded by side IH. Therefore,
by WF0(tk), Tσtk is well-founded. Since Tσtk = Tσ⌢t 〈k〉 is well-founded whenever
σ⌢t 〈k〉 ∈ T , it follows that Tσt is well-founded, as desired.
Since |σs| = i+ 1− r for some r, the statement holds in particular for s. ⊣
LEMMA 6.9 (ACA0). Let φ be a basic rank n + 1 formula, let s ∈ Tn+1(T ), and
suppose that for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, WFn+1(t). Then WFn+1(s).
PROOF. Without loss of generality, we may assume φ is the formula ∃xψ. It suffices
to show that whenever the assumption holds of s, WF ′n+1(s). If s decides φ we have
WFn+1(s) by assumption, so assume s does not decide φ. Assume s satisfies the
premise of WF ′n+1(s): whenever t ⊇ πn+1n (s) and t ≺+1 s, WFn(t).
First, consider any s+ ⊇ s such that (s+ \ s) ∩ Fn+1 = {φ}, so s+ decides φ.
Suppose t ⊇ πn+1n (s+) and t ≺+1 s+. Then there is a formula ∀xψ′ ∈ s+ and a k such
that tˆ ⊢ ¬ψ′(k). We must have ∀xψ′ ∈ s and therefore t ≺+1 s, so WFn(t). Since
WFn+1(s+) holds, it follows that whenever t ⊇ πn+1n (s+), WFn(t).
Now let s− = s ∪ {∀x¬ψ} and suppose t ⊇ πn+1n (s−) and t ≺+1 s−. As before,
there is a formula ∀xψ′ ∈ s− and a k such that t ⊢ ψ′(k). If ψ′ 6= ¬ψ, again we
have WFn(t) since t ≺+1 s. Otherwise, set s+ = t ∪ s ∪ {φ}; then πn+1n (s+) = t,
and therefore WFn(t) by the preceding paragraph. So for any t ⊇ πn+1n (s−) with
t ≺+1 s−, WFn(t). Since s− decides φ, we have WFn+1(s−), and therefore for
all t ⊇ πn+1n (s−), WFn(t). Since πn+1n (s−) = πn+1n (s), it follows that whenever
t ⊇ πn+1n (s), WFn(t), and therefore WF ′n+1(s). ⊣
We wish the previous lemma to hold even when rk(φ) < n. To do this we prove the
following inductive step.
LEMMA 6.10 (ACA0). Let φ be a basic rank m formula, let n ≥ m, and suppose
that:
Whenever s ∈ Tn(T ) and for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, WFn(t),
then WFn(s).
Then:
Whenever s ∈ Tn+1(T ) and for every t ⊇ s such that t decidesφ, WFn+1(t),
then WFn+1(s).
PROOF. Let s ∈ Tn+1(T ) be given, and suppose that for every t ⊇ s such that t
decides φ, WFn+1(t). Again, it suffices to show that WF ′n+1(s). Suppose that when-
ever t ⊇ πn+1n (s) and t ≺+1 s, WFn(t). Let t ⊇ πn+1n (s) be arbitrary; we will show
WFn(t). To do this, it suffices to show that whenever t′ ⊇ t decides φ, WFn(t′).
So suppose t′ ⊇ t is given such that t′ decides φ. If t′ ≺+1 s then WFn(t′) by
assumption. Otherwise, set s′ = t′∪s. Since s′ decidesφ, WFn+1(s′) holds. Whenever
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t′′ ⊇ πn+1n (s
′) = t′ with t′′ ≺+1 s′, also t′′ ≺+1 s, and therefore WFn(t′′). Therefore
for any t′′ ⊇ πn+1n (s′) = t′, WFn(t′′), and in particular WFn(t′).
⊣
LEMMA 6.11 (ACA0). If WFn+1(∅) then WFn(∅).
PROOF. If WFn+1(∅) then, in particular, WF ′n+1(∅). If t ⊇ πn+1n (∅) then we can-
not have t ≺+1 ∅, so the premise of WF ′n+1(∅) is trivially satisfied, and therefore
whenever t ∈ Tn(T ), t ⊇ πn+1n (∅) = ∅, so WFn(t). In particular, WFn(∅). ⊣
DEFINITION 6.12. Given s ∈ Tn(T ) and a formula φ(x, y) with only the displayed
free variables, we define a sequence σs,φ recursively: ∅ ⊆ σs,φ, and if τ ⊑ σs,φ and
there is exactly one i such that sˆ ⊢ φ(|τ |, i) then τ⌢〈i〉 ⊑ σs,φ.
DEFINITION 6.13. Let n be a successor‡. We define T̂n(T ) to consist of pairs (s, U)
such that:
• s ∈ Tn(T )
• U is a partial functions whose domain is a finite set of basic formulas of rank
≤ n of the form ∃zφ(x, y, z) with only the displayed free variables such that
σs,φ ≺ σs, and whose range is {0, 1}
• If U(φ) is defined then U(φ) = 1 iff one of the following excluding conditions
holds:
– There are m, i, j with i 6= j such that ∃zφ(m, i, z) ∈ s and ∃zφ(m, j, z) ∈ s,
– There is an m such that ∀u¬φ(m, p1(u), p2(u)) ∈ s, or
– σs,φ 6∈ T .
We say (s, U) decides U(φ) if U(φ) is defined. We say (s, U) ⊇ (t, V ) if s ⊇ t,
dom(U) ⊇ dom(V ), and U ↾ dom(V ) = V .
We define πˆ : T̂n(T )→ Tn(T ) by πˆ(s, U) = s.
If t ∈ Tn(T ) and (s, U) ∈ T̂n(T ), we say t ≺+1 (s, U) if there is a φ such that
U(φ) = 0 but t satisfies one of the above excluding conditions for φ.
ŴF
′
n(s, U) holds if
Suppose that for all t ⊇ s such that t ≺+1 (s, U), WFn(t); then for all
t ⊇ πˆ(s, U), WFn(t).
ŴFn(t, V ) holds if for all (s, U) ⊇ (t, V ), ŴF
′
n(s, U) holds.
These definitions are very similar to the n + 1 cases above; in place of existential
formulas, we have “witnesses that φ fails to define a path to the left of the official path”.
As above, we have
LEMMA 6.14 (ACA0). If n is a successor,
1. If ŴFn(t, V ) holds and (s, U) ⊇ (t, V ) then ŴFn(s, U) holds.
2. If WFn(s) holds then ŴFn(s, U) holds.
3. If ŴFn(∅, ∅) then WFn(∅).
‡By a successor, we mean n > 0. In the remainder of this section, we will refer to numbers > 0
as “successors” in definitions or theorems which will apply unchanged when we generalize to infinite well
orderings.
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LEMMA 6.15 (ACA0). Let n be a successor. Let φ be a formula and suppose that
whenever (t, V ) ⊇ (s, U) and (t, V ) decides U(φ), ŴFn(t, V ). Then ŴFn(s, U).
PROOF. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 6.9. It suffices to show that ŴF
′
n(s, U).
Suppose the premise of ŴF
′
n(s, U) holds, so that whenever s′ ⊇ s and s′ ≺+1 (s, U),
WFn(s
′).
First, if s satisfies one of the excluding conditions for φ then (s, U ∪ {(φ, 1)}) ∈
T̂n(T ), and therefore ŴFn(s, U ∪ {(φ, 1)}). Since πˆ(s, U ∪ {(φ, 1)}) = πˆ(s, U), we
have ŴFn(s, U).
Otherwise, let (t, V ) extend (s, U) such that V (φ) = 1 and dom(V ) \ dom(U) =
{φ}, and let t′ ⊇ t with t′ ≺+1 (t, V ). Then there is a ψ such that t′ satisfies one
of the excluding conditions for ψ but V (ψ) = 0. Therefore U(ψ) = 0 as well, so
t′ ≺+1 (s, U), and therefore WFn(t′). Since ŴFn(t, V ) holds, it follows that for all
t′ ⊇ πˆ(t, V ), we have WFn(t′).
Now set V = U∪{(φ, 0)}, so (s, V ) decidesφ, and let t ⊇ swith t ≺+1 (s, V ). Then
there is a ψ such that t satisfies one of the excluding conditions for ψ but V (ψ) = 0.
If ψ 6= φ then t ≺+1 (s, U), and therefore WFn(t). If ψ = φ then (t, U ∪ {(φ, 1)})
also decides φ, and so we have shown in previous paragraph that again WFn(t). Since
ŴFn(s, V ), it follows that whenever t ⊇ s, WFn(s), as desired. ⊣
LEMMA 6.16 (ACA0). Let φ be a formula and suppose that whenever s ∈ Tn and
for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, WFn(t), then WFn(s). Then whenever (s, U) ∈
T̂n(T ) is such that for every (t, V ) ⊇ (s, U) such that (t, V ) decides φ, ŴFn(t, V ),
then ŴFn(s, U).
PROOF. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 6.10. It will suffice to show ŴF
′
n(s, U).
Suppose the premise of ŴF
′
n(s, U) holds, so whenever t ⊇ s and t ≺+1 s, WFn(t).
Let t ⊇ s be given. By assumption, it suffices to show that whenever t′ ⊇ t and t′
decides φ, WFn(t′). So let some t′ ⊇ t be given such that t′ decides φ. If t′ ≺+1 (s, U)
then WFn(t′). Otherwise (t′, U) ⊇ (s, U) and decides φ, so ŴFn(t′, U). Moreover,
whenever t′′ ⊇ t′ and t′′ ≺+1 (t′, U), t′′ ≺+1 (s, U), and therefore WFn(t′′). So we
have WFn(t′), as desired. ⊣
By a decision of rank n, we mean either a formula φ of rank n, or U(φ) where φ
is a basic formula of rank ≤ n in the form ∃zφ(x, y, z) with only the displayed free
variables. Note that if s decides φ or U(φ) and t ⊇ s then t decides φ or U(φ) as well;
therefore we may say an infinite path decides φ or U(φ) if any finite initial segment
does.
The following lemma is a modification of the usual statement that when S is a well-
founded subset of T̂n(T ) we can carry out transfinite induction along S.
LEMMA 6.17 (Πm(Π11)-TI0). Let m be a successor. Let S ⊆ T̂n(T ), and suppose
that there is no infinite path through S deciding every decision of rank n. Let A be a
formula in Πm(Π11) and suppose the following principle holds:
For any (s, U) ∈ S, if there is a decision d such that whenever (t, V ) ⊇
(s, U), (t, V ) ∈ S, and (t, V ) decides d, A(t, V ) holds, then A(s, U) holds.
Then for every (s, U) ∈ S, A(s, U) holds.
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Despite the complicated statement, this lemma actually just reformulates transfinite
induction in a convenient form. Transfinite induction is usually stated for trees which
are genuinely well-founded; equivalently, there are no paths satisfying a Π1 property
(namely, having elements at every level). Here we restrict ourselves to those paths
satisfying a Π2 property—deciding every decision. The fact that these are equivalent is
essentially a consequence of the well-known fact that statements of the form ∀X∃y∀zφ
(for φ quantifier-free) are equivalent to statements of the form ∀X∃yφ′.
PROOF. Fix a surjective function ρ from N to the set of decisions, and consider the
tree S ′ of increasing sequences σ from S such that for each i, if ρ(i) is a decision of
rank ≤ n then σ(i) decides ρ(i). Clearly any infinite path through S ′ gives an infinite
path through S deciding all formulas, so S ′ is well-founded.
Let A′(σ) hold if A(σ(|σ| − 1)) holds, so A′ is a Πm(Π11) formula. We claim A′
is progressive: let σ be given with (s, U) its final element, and suppose that for all
(t, V ) such that σ⌢〈(t, V )〉 ∈ S ′, A′(σ⌢〈(t, V )〉). Then whenever (t, V ) ⊇ (s, U)
and (t, V ) decides ρ(|σ|), A′(σ⌢〈(t, V )〉), and therefore A(t, V ). Therefore A(s, U),
and so A′(σ).
So by transfinite induction on S ′, A′ holds of all σ, and in particular, A(s, U) for all
(s, U) ∈ S. ⊣
DEFINITION 6.18.
T̂n(T )
+
= {(s, U) ∈ T̂n(T ) | U(φ) = 1 whenever U(φ) is defined}.
The following lemma is stated with premises we have already shown to be true so
that it can easily be adapted to the case where n is replaced by an infinite well-ordering
later.
THEOREM 6.19 (Πn+2(Π11)-TI0). Let n be a successor. Suppose that:
• Whenever WF0(πn0 (s)), ŴFn(s, U),
• If ŴFn(∅, ∅) then WF0(∅),
• There is no infinite path through T̂n(T )
+
deciding every decision.
Then T is well-founded.
PROOF. We first show that ŴFn(s, U) holds for all (s, U) ∈ T̂n(T ) \ T̂n(T )
+
. Let
(s, U) be given with U(φ) = 0 for some φ. If Tσs,φ is ill-founded then σs,φ ≺ σs
witnesses WF0(πn0 (s)), and therefore ŴFn(s, U). Otherwise, for each τ ∈ Tσs,φ , let
Sτ = {(t, V ) ⊇ (s, U) | σt,φ = τ}.
We proceed by induction on τ ∈ Tσs,φ showing that for every (t, V ) ∈ Sτ , ŴFn(t, V ).
Let (t, V ) ∈ Sτ be given and suppose that for every k such that σt,φ⌢〈k〉 ∈ T
and every (t′, V ′) ⊇ (s, U) with σt′,φ = σt,φ⌢〈k〉, ŴFn(t′, V ′). Let (t′, V ′) be
any extension of (t, V ) deciding ∃kφ(|σt|, k) (note that, pairing variables and using the
fact that n is a successor, this has the same rank as φ). Then since V ′(φ) = V (φ) =
U(φ) = 0, it must be that there is such a k, and therefore t′ ⊢ φ(|σt|, k) for some k and
σt′,φ ∈ T , so ŴFn(t
′, V ′). So ŴFn(t′, V ′) holds for any (t′, V ′) ⊇ (t, V ) deciding
∃kφ(|σt|, k), and therefore ŴFn(t, V ) holds.
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By induction, for any τ ∈ Tσs,φ , any (t, V ) ∈ Sτ satisfies ŴFn(t, V ). In particular,
ŴFn(s, U).
Now we show that ŴFn(s, U) holds for T̂n(T )
+
using the modified induction given
by the previous lemma. Suppose that (s, U) ∈ T̂n(T )
+
and ψ is a decision such that
whenever (t, V ) ⊇ (s, U), (t, V ) ∈ T̂n(T )
+
, and (t, V ) decides ψ, ŴFn(t, V ). Then
for any (t, V ) ⊇ (S,U) deciding ψ, either (t, V ) ∈ T̂n(T )
+
, in which case ŴFn(t, V )
by assumption, or (t, V ) 6∈ T̂n(T )
+
, in which case we have just shown that ŴFn(t, V ).
Therefore, by the previous lemma, for every (s, U) ∈ T̂n(T )
+
, ŴFn(s, U).
It follows in particular that ŴFn(∅, ∅), and therefore WF0(∅). Since there are no
σ ∈ T with σ ≺ ∅, it follows that T∅ = T is well-founded. ⊣
DEFINITION 6.20. Let φ be a closed formula of L. Then φˆ(X,Y ) is the formula of
second-order arithmetic which interprets the function symbol F by X and the predicate
symbol Tˆ by Y .
LEMMA 6.21 (ACA0). Let Λ be a path through Tn(T ) deciding all formulas of
rank ≤ n and let σΛ be the corresponding sequence through T given by σΛ(i) = j iff
F (i) = j ∈ Λ(m) for some (and therefore cofinitely many) m.
Then whenever φ is a closed formula of rank ≤ n, the following are equivalent:
1. There is an m such that Λ(m) ⊢ φ,
2. φˆ(σΛ, T ).
PROOF. We proceed by induction on formulas. When φ is atomic, the equivalence
follows immediately from the definitions.
Suppose the claim holds for φ and ψ. The claim for ¬φ follows from the equivalence
for φ and the fact that Λ decides all formulas of rank ≤ n, including ¬φ. Similarly for
other propositional combinations of φ and ψ.
Suppose that for every k, the claim holds for φ(k). If ∃xφ ∈ Λ(m) then there is some
k such that Λ(m) ⊢ φ(k), and by IH, φˆ(k)(σΛ, T ), and therefore ∃̂xφ(σΛ, T ). If ∀xφ ∈
Λ(m) then there are no m′, k such that Λ(m′) ⊢ ¬φ(k), and therefore ¬̂φ(k)(σΛ, T )
never holds, so ∀̂xφ(σΛ, T ) holds. The other direction follows since either ∃̂xφ(σΛ, T )
or ∀̂x¬φ(σΛ, T ) must hold, and there is some m such that either ∃xφ ∈ Λ(m) or
∀x¬φ ∈ Λ(m). ⊣
THEOREM 6.22. For any finite n > 0, Πn+2(Π11)-TI0 implies Σn-LPP.
PROOF. Let T be a tree of finite sequences and let ≺ be a well-founded partial order.
Suppose that for every path Λ through T , there is a Λ′ which is Σn in T ⊕ Λ with
Λ′ ≺ Λ.
Suppose there were an infinite path Λ through T̂n(T )
+
deciding every decision of
rank ≤ n. For each i, there is a unique σΛ(i) such that F (i) = σΛ(i) ∈ πˆ(Λ(j))
for some j (and therefore cofinitely many j). The function σΛ must be a path through
T . Suppose Λ′ ≺ σΛ and there is a Σn formula φ such that ∃zφ(i, j, z, T, σΛ) iff
Λ′(i) = j. By the previous lemma, we have ∃zφ(i, j, z) ∈ Λ(m) for some m iff
Λ′(i) = j. Since Λ′ is a path through T , none of the excluding conditions for φ can
ever hold, so whenever Λ(j) = (s, U) and U(φ) is defined, U(φ) = 0. But this would
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contradict the fact that Λ is a path through T̂n(T )
+
. So there is no infinite path Λ
through T̂n(T )
+
deciding every decision.
Observe that the first two conditions in Theorem 6.19 all hold in Πn+2(Π11)-TI0
(since n is finite), so we obtain the conclusion that T is well-founded. ⊣
§7. The Nash-Williams Theorem and Menger’s Theorem.
7.1. The Nash-Williams Theorem. In what follows, we will use the letter b (and
variants b′ and so on) to represent finite sequences which are intended to be increasing
(and specifically, members of a barrier). We briefly define the key notions needed to
state and prove the Nash-Williams Theorem; a more careful exposition is found in [8].
DEFINITION 7.1. A sequence b is increasing if whenever i < j, b(i) < b(j).
Let B be a set of finite increasing sequences. We write base(B) for the set of n such
that for some b ∈ B and some i ∈ dom(b), b(i) = n.
A barrier is a set B of finite increasing sequences such that:
• base(B) is infinite,
• If Λ is an infinite increasing sequence from base(B), there is a b ∈ B such that
b ⊏ Λ,
• If b, b′ ∈ B and b 6= b′ then rng(b) 6⊆ rng(b′)
If b is a non-empty sequence, we write b− for the sequence with |b−| = |b| − 1 given
by b−(i) = b(i+ 1) (and b−(i) is undefined if b(i+ 1) is).
If b, b′ are sequences, we write b ⊳ b′ if there is a b∗ such that b ⊑ b∗ and b′ ⊑ (b∗)−.
Let Q be a partial order. If B is a barrier, B′ ⊆ B (where B′ is finite or infinite), and
f : B′ → Q, f is good if for some b, b′ ∈ B′ with b ⊳ b′, f(b) Q f(b′). If f is not
good, f is bad. If for every b, b′ ∈ B′ with b ⊳ b′, f(b) Q f(b′) then f is perfect.
If B is a barrier,Q is a B-better-quasi-order (B-bqo) if for every barrier B′ ⊆ B and
every f : B′ → Q, f is good. Q is a better-quasi-order (bqo) if for every barrier B, Q
is a B-bqo.
B is a barrier iff {b | ∀b′ ∈ B b′ 6⊑ b} is well-founded as a tree from base(B).
DEFINITION 7.2. Given Q, Q˜ is the class of all pairs (α, f) where α is a well-order
and f : α → Q. If (α, f), (β, g) ∈ Q˜, we say (α, f)˜Q(β, g) if there is a strictly
increasing function π : α→ β such that for all γ ∈ α, f(γ) Q g(π(γ)).
NWT, the Nash-Williams Theorem, is the statement that for if Q is a bqo then Q˜ is
bqo.§
GHT, the Generalized Higman’s Theorem, is the statement that if Q is a B-bqo then
Q<ω is a B-bqo.¶
Marcone [8] has shown:
THEOREM 7.3. 1. In ATR0, NWT is equivalent to GHT.
2. Π1
1
-CA0 implies GHT.
§Note that even though Q˜ is not a set, we can still formulate the statement that Q˜ is bqo in second order
arithmetic.
¶Our statement of GHT differs slightly from Marcone’s: Marcone takes GHT to be the statement that
if Q is a B-bqo for all barriers B then Q<ω is a B-bqo for all barriers B, which is a Π1
3
statement, and
mentions this version of GHT as an intermediate step.
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Since GHT is a Π12 sentence, it is not possible for GHT be equivalent to Π11-CA0.
We will now show that Marcone’s proof goes through essentially unchanged in TMPP0.‖
DEFINITION 7.4. If B is a barrier and X ⊆ N, we write B ↾ X for {b ∈ B |
rng(b) ⊆ X}.
LEMMA 7.5 (RCA0). If X is an infinite subset of base(B) then B ↾ X is a barrier.
PROOF. Clearly base(B ↾ X) ⊆ X . Suppose Λ is an infinite increasing sequence
from X . Then since X ⊆ base(B), there is a b ∈ B such that b ⊏ Λ, and therefore
b ∈ B ↾ X . Therefore base(B ↾ X) = X and every infinite sequence through X has
an initial segment in B ↾ X . The other two conditions are immediate since B ↾ X ⊆
B. ⊣
LEMMA 7.6 (RCA0). If B′ ⊆ B is a barrier then B′ = B ↾ base(B′).
PROOF. Suppose b ∈ B ↾ base(B′). Let Λ be an infinite increasing sequence from
base(B′) such that b ⊏ Λ. Then there is a b′ ∈ B′ ⊆ B such that b′ ⊏ Λ. If b′ 6= b then
we have either rng(b) ⊆ rng(b′) or rng(b′) ⊆ rng(b), contradicting the fact that B is a
barrier. ⊣
DEFINITION 7.7. A sequence σ from B × Q, σ = 〈(b0, q0), . . . , (bk, qk)〉 is a bad
partial array if:
• When i < j, max bi ≤ max bj ,
• If bi ⊳ bj , qi 6Q qj ,
• If b ∈ B ↾ base({b0, . . . , bk}) and max b < max bk then there is an i < k such
that b = bi.
If σ is a bad partial array, we define a partial function fσ : B → Q by setting
fσ(b) = q iff there is an i such that σ(i) = (b, q). If Λ is an infinite path through the
tree of bad partial arrays, we define fΛ similarly.
LEMMA 7.8 (RCA0). f is a bad function from a barrier B′ ⊆ B to Q iff there is
an infinite path Λ through the tree of bad partial arrays such that f = fΛ.
PROOF. Suppose B′ ⊆ B is a barrier and f : B′ → Q is bad. Fix an enumeration
of B′, B′ = {b0, b1, . . . } such that if i < j then max bi ≤ max bj . Define Λ(i) =
(bi, f(bi)). Clearly f = fΛ. We must check that if σ ⊏ Λ then σ is a bad partial array;
the first two conditions are immediate from the enumeration of B′ and the fact that f is
bad. If b ∈ B ↾ base({b0, . . . , bk}) and max b < max bk then b ∈ B ↾ base(B′) = B′,
so there is an i < k such that b = bi.
Suppose Λ is an infinite path through the tree of bad partial arrays. Then fΛ is clearly
bad, and we must check that dom(fΛ) is a barrier. If b ∈ B ↾ base(dom(fΛ)) then
there must be some n such that b ∈ base(dom(fΛ↾n)) and max b < base(dom(fΛ↾n)),
which implies that b ∈ dom(fΛ↾n). ⊣
‖Marcone’s proof uses the “locally minimal bad array lemma”, which is a principle similar, and equivalent,
to the minimal path principle. This lemma is essentially an encapsulation of the particular application of the
minimal path principle we use below. Another family of relative principles—the relatively locally minimal
bad array lemma and so on—could be defined, but since they would be minor combinatorial variants on the
principles we have given, we do not do so.
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We use the following uniformly effective version of the clopen Ramsey Theorem (the
proof of the clopen Ramsey Theorem in ATR0 is carried out in [6], with another proof
given in [1]; the effective bounds for the complexity are given in [5]).
THEOREM 7.9 (ATR0). For each barrier B, there is an ordinal α such that when-
ever B′ ⊆ B is a barrier and c : B′ → {0, 1}, there is an infinite S ⊆ base(B) such
that S is Σα in c⊕B′ and c is constant on B ↾ S.
We may adapt colorings of B to colorings of pairs from B:
LEMMA 7.10 (ATR0). For each barrierB, there is an ordinalα such that whenever
B′ ⊆ B is a barrier and c : {b, b′ ∈ B′ | b ⊳ b′} → {0, 1}, there is an infinite
S ⊆ base(B) such that S is Σα in c⊕B′ and c is constant on {b, b′ ∈ B ↾ S | b ⊳ b′}.
PROOF. Whenever b, b′ ∈ B with b⊳b′, write b∪b′ for the unique increasing sequence
such rng(b ∪ b′) = rng(b) ∪ rng(b′). Define B∗ = {b∪ b′ | b, b′ ∈ B and b ⊳ b′}. Note
that B∗ is a barrier on base(B): if Λ is an infinite increasing sequence from base(B),
we may find some b ∈ B such that b ⊏ Λ. We may also find some b′ ∈ B such that
b′ ⊑ Λ−. Then we have b ⊳ b′, and therefore b ∪ b′ ⊑ Λ− and b ∪ b′ ∈ B∗. Let α
be such that given any coloring of a subbarrier of B∗, there is an infinite homogeneous
subbarrier Σα in c⊕ B∗.
Now let B′ ⊆ B be given and let c be a coloring of {b, b′ ∈ B′ | b ⊳ b′}. We may
define a coloring c∗ on (B′)∗ ⊆ B∗ by c∗(b ∪ b′) = c(b, b′). Let S ⊆ base(B′) be
given such that c∗ restricted to (B′)∗ ↾ S is constant. Then c restricted to B′ ↾ S is
constant. ⊣
THEOREM 7.11 (TLPP0). GHT holds.
PROOF. Let B be a barrier, and suppose Q is a B-bqo. We set (b, σ) ≺ (b′, σ′) if
|σ| < |σ′|; clearly≺ is a well-order on B×Q<ω. SupposeQ<ω is not a B-bqo; then let
Λ be a relatively minimal infinite sequence through the tree of bad partial arrays from
B to Q<ω.
Clearly fΛ(b) 6= 〈〉 for all b, so we may write fΛ(b) = g(b)⌢〈q(b)〉 for all b ∈
dom(fΛ). For b ⊳ b′, define c(b, b′) = 0 iff q(b) Q q(b′) and c(b, b′) = 1 otherwise.
By the previous lemma, there is an infinite S ⊆ dom(fΛ) ⊆ B such that c is constant
on B ↾ S—that is, q restricted to S is either bad or perfect. Since Q is a B-bqo, c must
be constantly 0, so q ↾ (B ↾ S) is perfect.
For each n, write Λ(n) = (bn, σn). Let n be least such that bn ∈ B ↾ S, and define
B∗ = B ↾ (S ∪ base({bi}i<n)). If bi ∈ B ↾ S, define Λ′0(i) = (bi, g(bi)), and
if bi ∈ B∗ \ (B ↾ S), define Λ′0(i) = (bi, f(bi)); if neither of these apply, Λ′0(i) is
undefined. Let Λ′ be the infinite sequence defined recursively by Λ′(i) = Λ′0(j) where
j is least such that Λ′0(j) is defined and there is no i′ < i with Λ′(i′) = Λ′0(j).
Observe that for i < n, Λ′(i) = Λ(i) (since by construction, for i < n, bi ∈
B∗ \ (B ↾ S)), and that Λ′(n) ≺ Λ(n) (since Λ′(n) = (bn, g(bn)) while Λ(n) =
(bn, g(bn)
⌢〈q(bn)〉)).
We now show that Λ′ is an infinite path through the tree of bad sequences. Since
dom(fΛ
′
) = B∗ is a barrier, we need only show that fΛ′ is bad. Suppose Λ′(i) =
(b, σ), Λ′(j) = (b′, σ′), and b ⊳ b′.
We consider three cases. If b ∈ B ↾ S and b′ ∈ B ↾ S then σ = g(b), σ′ =
g(b′). Since q ↾ (B ↾ S) is perfect, q(b) Q q(B′), and since g(b)⌢〈q(b)〉 6<ωQ
g(b′)⌢〈q(b′)〉, we must have g(b) 6<ωQ g(b′).
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If b ∈ B∗ \ (B ↾ S) and b′ ∈ B∗ \ (B ↾ S) then σ = f(b), σ′ = f(b′), and we have
f(b) 6<ωQ f(b
′).
Observe that for any b ∈ B ↾ S, max(base(B∗) \ S) < max b. In particular, this
means that it is not possible to have b ∈ B ↾ S but b′ ∈ B∗ \ (B ↾ S). The remaining
case is that b ∈ B∗ \ (B ↾ S) while b′ ∈ B ↾ S. In this case we have σ = f(b) while
σ′ = g(b′). Since g(b′) <ωQ f(b′) and f(b) 6
<ω
Q f(b
′), we have f(b) 6<ωQ g(b′).
ThereforeΛ′ is an infinite sequence through the tree of bad partial arrays and Λ′ ≺ Λ.
It remains to check that the proof just given goes through in TLPP0. It suffices to
show that for each B, there is an α such that Λ′ is Σα in Λ. Since Λ′ is computable
from the set S, this follows from the fact that the coloring c is computable from Λ and
there is an α such that S is always Σα in c. ⊣
COROLLARY 7.12. NWT holds in TLPP0 .
7.2. Menger’s Theorem. In this subsection, we discuss a theorem about graphs.
When G is a graph, we write V (G) for the set of vertices and E(G) for the set of edges.
DEFINITION 7.13. If G is a graph and A ⊆ V (G), B ⊆ V (G), an A-B path is a
finite sequences of vertices v0, . . . , vn such that v0 ∈ A, vn ∈ B, and for each i < n,
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E(G).
An A-B separator is a set C ⊆ V (G) such that every A-B path in G contains an
element of C.
Menger’s Theorem for countable graphs is:
THEOREM 7.14. For any G and any A,B ⊆ V (G), there is a set M of disjoint A-B
paths and an A-B separator C such that C consists of exactly one vertex from each
path in M .
The proof uses the following notions:
DEFINITION 7.15. A warp in (G,A,B) is a subgraph W of G such that:
• A ⊆ V (W ),
• W is a union of disjoint paths beginning in A.
If W is a warp in (G,A,B), ter(W ) is the set of vertices in V (W ) which are the
terminal elements of paths beginning in A.
A warp W is a wave if ter(W ) is an A-B separator.
We order waves by W ≤ Y if W is a subgraph of Y .
It will be convenient to assume that our warps and waves do not contain elements of
A except as the first element of a path.
Shafer [13] shows that Menger’s Theorem for countable graphs is provable inΠ11-CA0,
and our treatment of Menger’s Theorem follows his paper. We will show
THEOREM 7.16 (TLPP0). Menger’s Theorem for countable graphs holds.
His proof is split into two parts:
LEMMA 7.17 (Π1
1
-CA0). For any graphG and sets A,B ⊆ V (G), there is a count-
ably coded ω-model M of Σ1
1
-DC0 containingG,A,B such that M believes there is a
maximal (with respect to ≤) wave W .
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LEMMA 7.18 (ACA0). If M is a countably coded ω-model of Σ11-DC0 containing
G,A,B and M believes there is a maximal wave W then the conclusion of Menger’s
Theorem holds for G,A,B.
It suffices to show that the first lemma can be proven in TLPP0; by 4.6, we need
only show the following:
LEMMA 7.19 (ACA0). Let G,A,B be given. There is an ill-founded tree T , a well-
ordering≺, and a computable bijection π between waves and paths through T such that
whenever W ≤W ′, π(W ′)  π(W ).
PROOF. Fix an enumeration V (G) = {g0, g1, . . . } and an enumeration {p0, p1, . . . }
of all A-B paths in G. We define T to consist of sequences 〈δ0, . . . , δn〉 such that:
• If k = 2i then either δk = (0, 0) or δk = (1, qi) where qi is a path beginning with
A and ending with gi,
• If k = 2k + 1 then δk = (i+ 2, Si) where Si is a non-empty subset of V (pi),
• If qi intersects qj then either qi is an end-extension of qj or qj is an end-extension
of qi,
• If gi appears in qj then δ2i 6= (0, 0),
• If gi ∈ A then δ2i 6= (0, 0),
• If gi ∈ Sj then δ2i 6= (0, 0),
• There is some gi ∈ Sj such that no path qk is a proper end-extension of qi.
Given an infinite path Λ, we define a warp W = π−1(Λ) =
⋃
i qi. If gi ∈ A then qi
witnesses that gi ∈ V (W ). W is, by definition, a union of paths beginning in A, and the
third condition ensures that distinct paths are disjoint. To see that W is a wave, observe
that for any A-B path pi, some element in Si must be the final element of a path.
Conversely, given a wave W , we define a path π(W ) through this tree as follows:
• If gi ∈ V (W ) then π(W )(2i) = (1, qi) where qi is the (unique) path in W
beginning in A and ending with gi,
• If gi 6∈ V (W ) then π(W )(2i) = (0, 0),
• π(W )(2i + 1) = (i + 2, V (pi) ∩ V (W )).
Since W is a wave, π(W ) is a path through T .
We define ≺ by:
• (1, q) ≺ (0, 0),
• (i + 2, S) ≺ (i+ 2, S′) if S′ ( S.
To see that this is well-founded, note in (i+ 2, S), |S| ≤ |V (pi)| is finite.
We must check that if W < W ′ then π(W ′) ≺ π(W ). Since W < W ′, there
must be some gi ∈ V (W ) \ V (W ′); we may assume gi is the least such. Clearly
π(W ′)(2i) ≺ π(W )(2i), so we need only check that for j < i, π(W ′)(j)  π(W )(j).
For j even, by construction and the fact that i was chosen least, π(W )(j) = π(W ′)(j).
For j odd, since V (W ′) ⊆ V (W ), we must have π(W )(j)  π(W ′)(j) as desired.
To see that T is ill-founded, observe that there is a wave W (specifically, V (W ) = A
and E(W ) = ∅), and therefore π(W ) is an infinite path through T . ⊣
§8. The Relative Leftmost Path Principle. In this section we prove:
THEOREM 8.1 (ATR0). If α is well-ordered and a successor then any ω-model sat-
isfying Πα+2(Π11)-TI0 also satisfies Σα-LPP.
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We have covered the case where α is finite above, and in the case where α ≥ ω, we
actually only need Πα+1(Π11)-TI0.
Fix α and assume WO(α), and fix a model M satisfying Πα+1(Π11)-TI0. The argu-
ments below are carried out in the external model (of ATR0) concerning the internal
model. We write δ, γ for arbitrary elements of field(α) and λ for limits in field(α). We
also fix a tree T and an ordering ≺ belonging to M such that M |= WF (≺). We will
import as many definitions as possible from Section 6, since for successor levels our
definitions are unchanged.
DEFINITION 8.2. We define Lα to be the language L from above, together with, for
each limit λ ∈ field(α + 1), a new predicate Vλ. For each γ ∈ field(α + 1), we define
the rank γ formulas and the basic rank γ formulas inductively by:
• F (i) = j where i, j are terms is a basic rank 0 formula,
• All other atomic formulas are rank 0 formulas,
• If φ is a rank γ formula then ∃xφ and ∀xφ are basic rank γ + 1 formula,
• For any limit λ ∈ field(α+ 1) and any n, Vλ(n) is a basic rank λ formula,
• The rank γ formulas contain the basic rank γ formulas and are closed under
∧,∨,¬,→.
We write Fγ for the collection of basic formulas of rank γ, F<γ for
⋃
δ<γ Fδ , and
write rk(φ) for the least γ such that φ is a formula of rank γ.
Fix a Go¨del coding ⌈·⌉ of Lα. We define ⊢ on Lα by adding two additional clauses
to usual deduction relation for first-order logic:
• s ⊢ Vλ(⌈φ⌉) iff rk(φ) < λ and s ⊢ φ.
• If rk(φ) ≥ λ then s ⊢ ¬Vλ(⌈φ⌉).
DEFINITION 8.3. Let α be a well-ordering. For each γ ∈ field(α+1), define Tγ(T )
to be the set of consistent, finite sets s of closed basic formulas of rank ≤ γ such that:
• If F (i) = k ∈ s and i′ < i then there is a j′ such that F (i′) = j′ ∈ s,
• Let i be largest such that for some j, the formula F (i) = j ∈ s; then the sequence
〈F (0), . . . , F (i)〉 ∈ T ,
• If ∃xφ(x) ∈ s then there is some i such that s ∩ Frk(φ) ⊢ φ(i),
• If Vλ(⌈φ⌉) ∈ s then rk(φ) < λ and s ∩ F≤rk(φ) ⊢ φ.
If s ∈ Fλ, we write rk(s) = max{rk(φ) | φ ∈ s ∩ F<λ}.
We say s decides Vλ(⌈φ⌉) if Vλ(⌈φ⌉) ∈ s, Vλ(⌈¬φ⌉) ∈ s, or rk(φ) ≥ λ.
If δ ≤ γ, define πγδ : Tγ(T )→ Tδ(T ) by π
γ
δ (s) = {φ ∈ s | rk(φ) ≤ δ}.
If δ < λ, t ∈ Tδ(T ), s ∈ Tλ(T ), we write t ≺+1 s if there is a formula Vλ(⌈φ⌉) ∈ s
such that t ⊢ ¬φ.
DEFINITION 8.4. We extend the definition of WF ′γ ⊆ Tγ(T ) by adding a definition
for limits:
• WF ′λ(t) holds if WF ′rk(t)(πλrk(t)(t)).
Note that, as above, each WFλ is a Πλ(Π11) formula.
LEMMA 8.5. If WFγ(s) and s ⊆ t then WFγ(t).
LEMMA 8.6. Let δ ≤ γ ≤ α. Then:
1. If WFδ(πγδ (s)) then WFγ(s), and
2. If t ∈ Tγ(T ) ∩ Tδ(T ) and WFγ(t) then WFδ(t).
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PROOF. We prove these by simultaneous induction on δ, γ. (This is necessarily an
about M carried out externally to M . Note that the statements of these two parts are of
the form ∀x(φ(x) → ψ(x)) where φ, ψ are Πγ(Π11) or Πδ(Π11) with δ ≤ γ ≤ α, so the
statement of the theorem is Πγ+1(Π11), and so at worst Πα+1(Π11).) Suppose the claim
holds for all pairs δ′ ≤ γ′ with either δ′ < δ or γ′ < γ.
If γ = δ, this is immediate. Suppose δ < γ and γ = β + 1. If WFδ(πβ+1δ (s)) then
by IH, WFβ(πβ+1β (s)), and therefore by Lemma 6.7, WFβ+1(s).
If t ∈ Tβ+1(T ) ∩ Tδ(T ) = Tδ(T ) and WFβ+1(t) then t contains no formula of rank
β + 1, and so there are no s ⊇ πβ+1β (t) = t such that s ≺+1 t, so we must have
WFβ(t), and therefore by IH, WFδ(t).
Suppose γ = λ is a limit. If WFδ(πλδ (s)), we consider two cases. If rk(s) ≥ δ then
we have WFrk(s)(πλrk(s)(s)) by applying the first part of IH to δ, rk(s), and therefore
WFλ(s). If rk(s) < δ then we have πλδ (s) = πλrk(s)(s), so by applying the second part
of IH to rk(s), δ, we have WFrk(s)(s).
Suppose t ∈ Tλ(T ) ∩ Tδ(T ) and WFλ(t). Then since rk(t) ≤ δ, we may apply the
first part of IH to rk(t), δ to obtain WFδ(t). ⊣
LEMMA 8.7. Let δ ≤ γ ≤ α, let φ be a basic rank δ formula, let s ∈ Tγ(T ), and
suppose that for every t ⊇ s such that t decides φ, WFγ(t). Then WFγ(s).
PROOF. By main induction on δ and side induction on γ. (Note that for a given γ
the statement is Πγ+1(Π11), so the statement is Πα+1(Π11).) The case where δ = γ = 0
is handled by Lemma 6.8. The case where δ = γ and γ is a successor is handled by
Lemma 6.9. The case where δ < γ and γ is a successor is handled by Lemma 6.10.
So suppose γ is a limit. It suffices to show that if for every t ⊇ s such that t decides
φ, WFγ(t), then WF ′γ(s). If δ = γ then φ = Vγ(⌈ψ′⌉); in this case, we set ψ = ∃xψ′
for some variable x not appearing in ψ; otherwise δ < γ and we set ψ = ψ′. Set
β = max{rk(s), rk(ψ)} < γ.
Suppose t ⊇ πγβ(s) and t decides ψ. Set
t′ =


t ∪ s if δ < γ
t ∪ s ∪ {V (⌈ψ′⌉)} if δ = γ and t ⊢ ψ
t ∪ s ∪ {V (⌈¬ψ′⌉)} if δ = γ and t ⊢ ¬ψ
Then for any ρ, t′ ⊢ ρ iff t ⊢ ρ, so t′ is consistent. Also, t′ ⊇ s and t′ decides φ, so
WFγ(t
′). Since rk(t′) = β and πγβ(t′) = t, we have WFβ(t). Since WFβ(t) holds
for all t ⊇ πγβ(s) deciding ψ, it follows from IH that WFβ(π
γ
β(s)) holds. Therefore
WFγ(s) holds. ⊣
LEMMA 8.8. If WFγ(∅) then WF0(∅).
PROOF. By induction on γ. If γ is a successor, this follows immediately from IH and
Lemma 6.11. If γ is a limit then since rk(∅) = 0, we immediately have WFγ(∅). ⊣
The definition of T̂γ+1 given above for γ a successor is unchanged. In particular, we
obtain:
THEOREM 8.9. Assume α is a successor. Suppose there is no infinite path (in M )
through T̂α(T )
+
deciding all decisions of rank ≤ α. Then T is well-founded (in M ).
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PROOF. We apply Theorem 6.19. The first two assumptions are given by Lemmas
8.8 and 8.7. Note that Lemma 6.17 is identical for Πα+1(Π11) formulas. ⊣
DEFINITION 8.10. Let φ be a closed formula of Lα. Then φˆ(X,Y ) is the formula
of second-order arithmetic which interprets the function symbol F by X , the predicate
symbol T by Y , and Vλ(⌈φ⌉) by ∀Y (Hθ(λ, Y )→ (⌈φ⌉, rk(φ)) ∈ Y ) for a suitable
formula θ.
LEMMA 8.11. Let Λ be a path (in M ) through Tα(T ) deciding all formulas of rank
≤ α and let σΛ be the corresponding path through T given by σΛ(i) = j iff F (i) = j ∈
Λ(m) for some (and therefore cofinitely many) m.
Then whenever φ is a closed formula of rank ≤ α, the following are equivalent:
1. There is an m such that φ ∈ Λ(m),
2. φˆ(σΛ, T ).
PROOF. We proceed by induction on formulas. The only new case is when φ =
V (⌈ψ⌉); this is easily covered by the inductive hypothesis. ⊣
The proof of Theorem 6.22 goes through unchanged, showing that the model M
satisfying Πα+1(Π11)-TI0 contains a path satisfying Σα-LPP, which completes the
proof of Theorem 8.1.
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